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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________________ 
 
No.  18-1054 
________________ 
 
JACOB ANDERSON, 
                                    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ABINGTON HEIGHTS SCHOOL DISTRICT; PH.D. MICHAEL MAHON, 
Superintendent; PH.D. THOMAS QUINN, Assistant Superintendent; 
MICHEAL ELIA, Principal of Abington Heights Middle School; 
EDUARDO ANTONETTI, Vice Principal of Abington Heights 
Middle School; BRIAN KELLY, School Counselor 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-12-cv-02486)  
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 6, 2018 
 
Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 22, 2019) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Jacob Anderson is a student in the Abington Heights School District who receives 
disability accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 701 
et. seq. In 2012, Jacob’s mother, Kim Anderson, initiated a special education proceeding 
against the School District, claiming he was deprived of legally mandated educational 
accommodations, including during a school disciplinary incident. The parties 
subsequently settled the claim. Jacob then brought a new case revisiting the disciplinary 
incident, making several claims, of which only two remain at issue. The District Court 
found that Jacob’s Section 504 violation claim was barred by the terms of the prior 
settlement agreement and his breach of fiduciary duty claim was barred by the 
defendants’ statutory immunity from liability. We will affirm.  
I. 
Jacob was a thirteen-year-old student at Abington Heights Middle School in 
February 2011. He has two diagnoses, ADHD and dysthymia, for which he receives 
instructional support through a Section 504 plan. On February 24, 2011, the School 
District developed a suspicion that Jacob was distributing “spice,” or synthetic marijuana, 
on school property. The next day, the School District held him in in-school suspension 
and conducted several interviews with him during the course of the day. Participants in 
these interviews and in Jacob’s detention included Principal Michael Elia; Vice-Principal 
Eduardo Antonetti; and school counselor, Brian Kelly. The School District did not inform 
Ms. Anderson of the investigation until she called the school after Jacob failed to arrive 
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home on the bus, at which point Antonetti asked her to come to school and notified her of 
the disciplinary incident. 
Before the School District took further disciplinary action against Jacob, 
Superintendent Michael McMahon met with the school’s special education director and 
determined that Jacob’s behavior was not a manifestation of his disabilities. The School 
District never informed Ms. Anderson that the school was in the process of making this 
determination, nor did the School District allow her to contribute to or challenge it. The 
School District subsequently conducted an expulsion hearing, at which Jacob and Ms. 
Anderson were present, but without legal counsel. Jacob was found in violation of school 
policies and was expelled for the remainder of the 2010–11 school year and for the 2011–
12 school year, with instructions to reapply for the 2012–13 school year. 
In November 2011, Ms. Anderson requested a special education due process 
hearing, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400 et. seq., and Section 504. The Hearing Officer held the School District violated 
Jacob’s rights both in failing to thoroughly evaluate and accommodate his disabilities in 
the years prior to 2011 and in failing to follow procedural safeguards for a disabled 
student in the disciplinary proceeding itself. The School District appealed the decision to 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The parties 
settled, and the Court dismissed their case accordingly.  
Approximately three months later, Ms. Anderson filed the complaint in this case. 
Jacob was subsequently substituted as plaintiff because, once he turned eighteen, Ms. 
Anderson no longer had standing to sue on his behalf. Several of Jacob’s claims were 
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dismissed with prejudice, and he then had an opportunity to amend his complaint to 
allege facts sufficient to support his remaining claims. On a second motion to dismiss, 
additional claims were dismissed from the case, leaving claims of Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process violation, breach of fiduciary duty as to three of the individual 
defendants, and violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act still in dispute. After 
discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the School District on all of 
the remaining claims. Jacob now appeals the Court’s order as to the Section 504 and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims.1 
II. 
 We will affirm the grant of summary judgment. The settlement of the initial 
dispute fully resolved the Section 504 claim that Jacob now attempts to revisit. He 
currently alleges that, in the February 24–25, 2011 disciplinary incident that resulted in 
his expulsion, he never received “an impartial hearing” or other “review procedure,” 
violating his right to an equal education under Section 504. App. Vol. II, 38–39. The 
earlier proceeding adjudicated and subsequently settled precisely this issue. In that 
proceeding, Ms. Anderson brought Section 504 and IDEA claims against the School 
District, including the claim that Jacob was deprived of a hearing or equivalent 
                                              
1  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701; and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. See Norfolk S. Ry. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 
2008). Summary judgment may be granted where “there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
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procedural protections during the February 24–25, 2011 disciplinary incident. The 
Hearing Officer ruled in favor of Ms. Anderson, and the parties later stipulated that “[the 
School District]’s failure to conduct a manifestation hearing and/or Section 504 hearing 
was fully adjudicated” during the hearing. Pl.’s Statement of Facts Mot. Partial Summ. J. 
3:12-cv-02486-RDM, ECF No. 94, ¶ 41; see also Def.’s Answer Statement of Facts, No. 
101, ¶ 41. 
The School District appealed the Hearing Officer’s decision to the District Court, 
where the parties entered mediation. They settled, agreeing “to resolve, without further 
legal proceedings, the issues raised in the above referenced matter.” Settlement 
Agreement 3:12-cv-02486-RDM, ECF No. 8, Ex. 4, 1. Specifically, Ms. Anderson 
released “all claims regarding the Student’s educational programming and/or placement, 
that they may now have or which may in the future arise relative to the above disputes . . . 
including claims . . . that they and/or the Student may otherwise have arising under the 
IDEA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or the ADA.” Id. at 7. The agreement also 
provided that it “does not settle claims that are non-educational in nature which may arise 
from the investigation [of] February 24 and 25, 2011, including a claim pursuant to 
Section 504, . . . but does settle all claims under Section 504 . . . based upon, related to, or 
arising out of the Student’s 504 plans . . . .” Id. at 7–8. 
Jacob’s claim that he was denied a hearing to which he was entitled pursuant to his 
Section 504 plan is clearly educational in nature and “arise[s] out of the Student’s 504 
plans.” Id. at 8. It is thus released by the settlement agreement according to the 
agreement’s plain text. See Pennsbury Vill. Assocs., LLC v. Aaron McIntyre, 11 A.3d 
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906, 914 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted) (“[I]t is well settled that the effect of a release is 
to be determined by the ordinary meaning of its language.”). As the District Court 
discussed, there may exist some claims Jacob could bring which would allege a Section 
504 violation of his right to equal participation in schooling during the February 2011 
incident, yet would not arise out of his Section 504 accommodations plan.2 Here, though, 
Jacob’s claim falls squarely within the scope of the settlement agreement. Because his 
Section 504 claim is barred by the settlement agreement, we do not consider the District 
Court’s alternative holdings on the merits. 
Jacob next contends the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
School District on his breach of fiduciary duty claim. We will affirm the Court’s holding 
that all three individual defendants (Elia, Antonetti, and Kelly) are immune from suit 
under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”), which protects 
local officials and the agencies employing them from liability for injury. 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 8541; see Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2006). The PSTCA 
includes eight exceptions allowing liability for particular kinds of injury, none of which 
are at issue here. Id. § 8542(b). An additional exception provides that PSTCA immunity 
does not apply where “the act of the employee caused the injury” and the act constitutes 
“willful misconduct.” Id. § 8550. Willful misconduct is “a demanding level of fault,” 
requiring that “the actor desired to bring about the result that followed or at least was 
                                              
2 The District Court offers, as an example of the type of claim that may not be released by 
the settlement agreement, “an argument that [Jacob’s] prolonged detention on February 
25, 2011, excluded him from participation in, or denied him the benefit of, attending his 
classes, and that this detention was by reason of his disability as opposed to those reasons 
asserted by the defendants.” App. Vol. II, 31. 
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aware that it was substantially certain to follow, so that such desire can be implied.” 
Sanford v. Stiles, 546 F.3d 298, 315 (3d. Cir. 2006) (quoting Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 
537 Pa. 68, 75 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Jacob’s complaint alleges that, because of several acts of the defendants, including 
not calling the police, detaining Jacob for an entire school day, and not notifying Jacob’s 
mother of his detention until the end of the day, Jacob experienced “pain, psychological 
and emotional suffering.” App. Vol. II, 34. He argues these actions constitute “a willful 
specific choice” by the individual defendants. Appellant Br. 25. But Jacob points to no 
evidence indicating that the individual defendants desired to cause him any injury, nor 
that they were aware these actions would certainly do so. There is therefore no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the individual defendants committed willful 
misconduct, and they are immune from suit as a matter of law. Because the defendants 
are immune from suit, it is unnecessary to address the District Court’s alternative 
holdings relating to whether they could be liable for breach of duty if not immune. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
